omnist.world

English

Alevitisch · Diese Tradition mit einer anderen vergleichen

Metin Mat - The Role of Alevis in the Peace Process

Berlin Alevi Toplumu / Cemevi (AL TV Berlin) · Berlin Alevi Toplumu / Cemevi (AL TV Berlin) · 2026-11-04 · Berlin · Quelle

Dieser Inhalt ist noch nicht ausgewertet.

Wortlaut anzeigen
Dear Metin Mat, welcome. >> Thank you for having me. >> Today, while initiatives for the resolution of the Kurdish issue and disarmament are ongoing, we will talk about how Alevis evaluate this process. We will chat about the expectations with which they approach the establishment of peace and the concerns they hold regarding their own rights. >> Yes. Now, about 2 years have passed in the process carried out for the resolution of the Kurdish issue and disarmament in Turkey. So, where do Alevis and Alevi organizations stand in this process? >> Thank you. Well, now, to address this issue healthily, one must also look at it historically. Let me say this first. What is the stance and perspective of Alevis regarding this peace? This is very important. Yunus Emre says something very beautiful. "A word can end a war, a word can cause a head to fall, a word can turn poison into honey." A word that can turn poison into honey. Our spiritual leaders always say this. The essential thing is to turn poison into honey. It is impossible for a faith that looks at all 72 nations with the same eye, rejects discrimination based on religion , language, race, or gender, and adheres to moral principles—such as being master of one's hands, loins, tongue, food, and spouse—to embrace or take a side in violence or war. Therefore, when you speak of peace, it is something Alevism already embraces and bases its own faith upon. What do our poets say? Love is our religion. We believe in no other religion. In this faith, there is no malice, hatred, or enmity. There is no room for enmity. When we look at it in this context, this is our perspective on humanity, not just in Turkey but throughout the world. When we look at the problems experienced across Turkey, we certainly want this war and violence to end from the bottom of our hearts. Alevis want this. They are in favor of it. They are undoubtedly in favor of it. Now, here is the problem . Where do the Alevis stand in this business? Forget about the Alevis; it has been a 2-year process. What about Turkey's largest party, or the new opposition party? Where do they stand in this process? Are they involved in it? When we look at it this way, while those who can contribute to Turkey's democratization should be involved, conducting this process only through talks in certain places—excluding these elements—inevitably increases concerns and doubts. This is not just what Alevis say; it is what every segment of society says when discussing this peace issue in Turkey. First of all, the state is not using a sincere language here. What do they call this process? They call it the process of national solidarity and integration. They call it the "Turkey without terror " process. What is the language used by the politicians in this process? The process of peace and a democratic society. If you notice, those in power who claim to have started this peace process don't even properly pronounce the word "peace ." This inevitably increases doubts and concerns. Now, we need to evaluate this process well from a historical perspective. We need to look a bit at the previous peace processes and this Kurdish-Turkish conflict. If we open this up, if we understand this, then our ideas and views on it will become much clearer. Or rather, it will become easier for us to be understood. Now, as you know, the PKK was established in Turkey in 1978. In 1984, it launched its first armed struggle in Şemdinli. The year 1984 was a period in Turkey when the generals, the September 12 generals, were still very influential. The Prime Minister was Turgut Özal, and during those times, he took every kind of measure against the PKK. I mean, things like the village guard system, the state of emergency governorship, and special teams. He put all of these into effect. But despite all of this, he saw that this problem was not being solved. In fact, the PKK grew even larger. Upon this, instead of continuing this with armed force, they tried to solve it with peace. In 1993, as everyone who follows these matters knows. Mesut Barzani, Celal Talabani, Kemal Burkay, and Abdullah Öcalan made a joint statement. There would be no armed struggle against Turkey. Now, this was actually aimed at overcoming the peace process and paving the way for peace. But what happened? This decision in 1993 was thwarted by the killing of 33 soldiers in Bingöl in that same year, 1993. It ended. Now, the interesting part is this. That is why we say peace. Yes, it must certainly happen . But when we look at this 1993 process, that picture shows us something very clearly. What happened after this incident? After these 33 soldiers were killed and the peace process was thwarted, Turkey experienced the darkest period of its history. The darkest period. Millions of villagers had to leave their villages. There were 17,000 unsolved murders, arrests, and tortures. Beyond that, Turkey's most famous and important intellectuals were killed. Like Turan Dursun, Bahri Çok, Muammer Aksoy, Uğur Mumcu. And beyond this, what else happened? We experienced the Sivas massacre on July 2, 1993, in Sivas. On March 12, 1995, we experienced the Gazi and Ümraniye massacres. Turkey was completely dragged into a dark process. When the economic crisis also arrived in 2003, the political parties of that era effectively hit rock bottom. The AKP, which split from the Welfare Party, was founded. It entered the elections. In the 2003 elections, it came to power alone. Of course, many things can be said about that governing process, but I am keeping it brief so as not to drag it out. When the AKP came to power in this period, one actually needs to look at the dark 90s to understand its rise, a period that the Chief of General Staff at the time, Doğan Güreş, had described as a "low-intensity conflict." It was truly a very dirty process. Now, after that process, once the AKP came to power, it continuously achieved success in the other elections it entered and always won. We arrived at the 2015 elections. Now, Turkey is heading to elections in 2015. The thing that everyone who analyzes Tayyip Erdoğan says is this. The AKP constantly conducts polls. It takes the pulse of society according to those polls. It determines its route accordingly. Now, probably In 2014, such a decision was made. Let me look quickly, uh It should be in my notes. In 2014, a law was passed in parliament . On July 16, 2014, the law on the termination of terrorism and the strengthening of social integration was published in the Official Gazette. In 1900, uh, pardon, in the year 2014. Now , in 2014, as you know, this table was established. Uh, these negotiations and such were being held. During these negotiations held in '14, Turkey went to elections in 2015, and while heading into those elections, uh, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP saw the following. Uh, they had no chance of forming a government alone. Therefore, they needed allies. Uh, especially Selahattin Demirtaş's rhetoric at that time was receiving tremendous, uh, acceptance from the public. I mean, let alone an ordinary musician, even the ultranationalists were listening to Selahattin Demirtaş. Uh, they were looking at him with sympathy. There was a tremendous change . They saw this. He saw this. They saw it, and, uh, three months before the elections, around March 2015 , Selahattin Demirtaş gave a speech. At his party's parliamentary group meeting, he said, "We will not make you president.""We will not make you president.""We won't make you president ." This is the sentence he repeated three times. This means the following. Uh, the political power of that period understood that it would not be able to take the Kurdish opposition to its side . Uh, this can also be clearly seen in the polls conducted during the election. Now , what happened next? Just a month after those June 7 elections, uh, uh, two police officers were murdered at night in Ceylanpınar. They were found dead in their own homes , and because of this, 7 Kurds were captured. They were imprisoned for approximately 23 years. They were brought to court after 23 years. It was understood that these seven people had nothing to do with this crime. They were acquitted. We don't know who killed these police officers in Ceylanpınar, how they were killed, or why they were killed, but we do know this. The table was overturned, and after the table was overturned, I mean, pay attention again , these are very interesting things. A dark period began once again. Bombs went off in Diyarbakır, Suruç, Ankara, and at the Ankara train station. Uh, 5 months later, the AKP won the elections again on its own with an even , uh, larger majority of votes. Now, in the period after that, this continued constantly. However, what we see right now, that is, the economic crisis Turkey has fallen into, uh, the recent fund scandal, in this tremendous process, Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP have no chance of winning the election, uh, uh, alone. Now, let me especially say this as well . In parentheses, until 2024, uh, that is , until the moment Devlet Bahçeli went to the parliament and shook the hands of the party members, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was actually in Tayyip Erdoğan's palm, but after that date... ... >> was in his palm, uh, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was in Devlet Bahçeli's palm. I mean, Devlet Bahçeli was directing things however he wanted; he was already bossing everyone around. But after that date, he even escalated this rhetoric. I mean, like, uh, "let the founding leader, Abdullah Öcalan, come and speak at the party group meeting." He escalated this rhetoric. Now, from here on, uh, Devlet Bahçeli is now in the palm of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan , of our leader, of our president. Uh. Because MHP votes are melting away seriously. The AKP's are melting, but the MHP's are melting too, and the MHP does not have the power, uh, to maintain the current government with these votes . The government, therefore, is in need of new alliances. I mean, as I say this, perhaps they might be concerned that we are speaking negatively about this peace process, but we must face the reality. I mean, if we are to prevent mistakes from happening again—and we must not allow them to—We need to analyze this soundly. That is why they have this need . The government wants to become more totalitarian and more anti-democratic. And where does the path to that lead? It leads through making society more religious. In my opinion, this is the goal of the government. Now, they cannot achieve this religious shift with the MHP. Why can they not? Both because their votes are low and because, if you look at the MHP—the nationalist base—they call themselves Muslim but live a Western-style life. They drink alcohol, go to nightclubs, and their daughters wear miniskirts. They don't have an overly religious side. But if they include the Kurds in this, with the Shafi Kurds—I emphasize this— they can achieve this religious agenda much more easily. This is the danger that I can see. Now, from here, I want to move to this point. When we conduct such an analysis, it is clear that every time a peace process is initiated and ends negatively, it costs Turkey dearly. Just like before, we must say that if they fail to conclude this upcoming process successfully, Turkey will be seriously affected and harmed, and the Alevis will be hurt the most. Let me give you a simple example. The Alevis never actually discuss these things. When the Alevis evacuated their villages during that war period, back in the village, their sacred sites, their spiritual leaders, their godparents, and their community foundations were all there. They were living Alevism in an integrated way. When they came to the cities, there was no such thing. They did not find that environment for their faith. This led to isolation. This prevented the Alevis from learning about Alevism. But for a Shafi Kurd, it was not like that. For the Muslim Kurd. Because they went to the mosque in the village, too. When they come to the city , they go to the mosque there as well. So, it was the Alevis who paid the price for this. But there is another thing we never talk about. Look, go to the Turkmen villages during this war process . In the Taurus Mountains and such, you have Turkmen Kizilbash, Cepni, Tahtaci, and Yoruk communities. A significant portion of them support the MHP. Why? The propaganda conducted by the state, regarding the soldiers from their villages who died in the conflict, caused many of them to become MHP supporters. So, the Alevi community is suffering a serious blow both in terms of faith and in losing its own base. Therefore, no matter what the Alevis do , despite all the negatives, when we analyze this situation both in terms of faith and politics, it is inevitable that they must draw lessons and contribute to this peace process. I will not give up on this. >> Coming to the present day, are Alevi organizations seen only as a social group supporting peace, or can they be one of the actors determining the conditions and the future of this process? I mean >> right now >> can they succeed while keeping the Alevis somewhat outside of this, or how can we, organizationally, become involved in this process? >> Now, uh, when we look at the ongoing negotiations, as I said at the beginning of my speech, let alone the Alevis. Even the main opposition party is not being included in the process. I mean, uh, it's proceeding on a different track. Uh , it's the same for the Alevis as well. Uh, fine, some things...... >> because their way of doing things is different, but does it have to be that way from our perspective? We need to shift the game to a different field here. I mean, uh, it's not just the talks held in Imrali or Kandil, you know. This is Turkey's problem, isn't it? It is Turkey's problem, and this issue burns everyone, it affects everyone. Therefore, everyone needs to be involved in this. I mean, uh, the Alevis need to be in it, and the Atatürkists need to be in it too. We must drag this situation into that field. Therefore, all segments in Turkey, especially the Alevis, democratic and especially socialist segments, and Atatürkists, need to position themselves and push to be able to get involved in these negotiations and determine their direction. For this, it is necessary to discuss and talk about this clearly and transparently everywhere. It is necessary to intervene. It is necessary to participate. If they don't do this, if it continues only as a negotiation held between, uh, two sides, uh, this will neither inspire confidence nor lead to a very wrong point. >> Yes. Now, this is also a serious topic of discussion. It concerns Abdullah Öcalan's historical references to the Idris-i Bitlisi and Yavuz Sultan Selim eras. Uh, although in the statement published on September 10-16, 2026, Abdullah Öcalan stated that he had no desire to melt Alevis into Sunnism and that he aimed for Alevis to be founding subjects of the democratic alliance with their own identities. But despite these statements, concerns were not alleviated and, uh, it caused reactions from a segment of Alevi, uh, intellectuals. Uh, what would you like to say about this? What does this mean historically and politically, despite this statement and Abdullah Öcalan's insistence that there is no such thing as a Sunni alliance? >> Now, uh, uh, regarding Abdullah Öcalan's point, I haven't read that, uh, sentence . Let me repeat it as you read it here. >> Yes. He had that statement, I mean. That his goal, his goal was not to melt Alevism into Sunnism. >> Yes. >> Uh, that he aimed for Alevis to be founding subjects of the democratic alliance with their own identities, that is, this is Abdullah Öcalan's, uh, goal . >> Now, it is necessary to speak healthily here. I mean, we, uh, I am personally someone who has always supported the Kurdish political movement. I mean, Kurds exist. Uh, as a people, uh, learning and preserving their own language and culture, uh, is their most natural right. Now, we have to look at this as something else. First of all, what is he saying? Alevism within Sunnism. Now, this means the following. It is seeing Alevism as a sect. This is wrong. They have no right to do such a thing. I mean , no one, look, we tell Tayyip Erdoğan this, we tell the state this too. No one can define our faith. They cannot find a cover for it. I mean, do we call it a part of Islam, a sect, or a path? This belongs to us. No one should be doing this to us. This is wrong. Secondly, that it won't melt within Sunnism. I mean, this isn't a correct sentence either. Why, man? The 600- year-old Ottoman Empire tried and couldn't do it. The 100-year-old Republic is still trying. It hasn't, uh , managed the Alevis. Therefore, this discourse is also not correct. Another thing is that their own identities are the subjects of a democratic alliance. Now, the problem here is as if Öcalan is giving us such a, you know, as if Abdullah Öcalan is assigning us this task. Which is not the case. Alevis must do this themselves. This is the duty of the Alevis. The Alevis need to do it. These are different things. Therefore, we need to calculate well what kind of impact the sentences we form will create in the society's memory . I mean, I don't find this statement correct. Now, as for the Idris Bitlisi issue, the Idris Bitlisi issue is also being distorted. This matter is being historically, uh, distanced from its reality. Some interpret it specifically according to their ideological interests and approaches. So what is this Idris Bitlisi matter? Uh, when Shah Ismail was establishing his state in Tabriz, the Shafi'i Kurds, specifically the Shafi'i Kurdish beys, went to Shah Ismail. They took his side. But what does Shah Ismail do? He arrests some of them. Uh, he removes all the beys from their duties. He, uh, >> cuts off the heads of the guides those beys sent. I mean, just like that. >> He appoints his own men in place of the beys. Seeing this as an opportunity, Idris Bitlisi, who worked for the Safavid palace, goes and makes a deal with Yavuz, and they form an alliance as per the agreement made with Yavuz. But this alliance, look, this alliance is not a Turkish-Kurdish alliance. This is a distortion. What kind of alliance? An alliance of what? This alliance is the formation of an alliance by the Muslim Hanafi Turks and Muslim Shafi'i Kurds against the Kızılbaş Kurds and Turks. And this alliance, for the death of these sections, meaning these Kızılbaş Kurds and Kızılbaş Turks, >> anyway, there was no national thing back then. I mean, that consciousness, like "I am Turk,""He is Kurd," there was no such national consciousness for an alliance. No, there is no such national consciousness. Okay, on a religious basis, and it is said that 40,000 Alevis, Kızılbaş, were killed in a single night. Now, the strange thing here is this. We need to see this. I mean, they say it created togetherness or something, right ? Is that even possible, my friend? Uh, for centuries, for centuries, the Kızılbaş Turk and Kızılbaş Kurd lived a life where the Muslim Kurd and Muslim Turk saw them as enemies. They were pushed out of social life, and do you know what the benefit of this was for the Ottomans? Now look, uh, when we look at Kızılbaşism, it is a belief that is intellectually, philosophically, literarily, and artistically very dominant. Uh, today, when you say Turkish poetry, if you take out Pir Sultan, Yunus, uh, Karacaoğlan, Dadaloğlu, there is nothing left called poetry. You mention Turkish humor; take Nasreddin Hodja out of the Ottoman era, and his jokes. Well, there is nothing left of humor. What did they do? They killed it, and an Ottoman Empire mired in bigotry collapsed. So, to manufacture a sense of brotherhood here—for instance, the Speaker of the Parliament Numan Kurtulmuş's statement on this matter is disgusting. These are, these are frightening things. These create, truly, very serious traumas in the memory of Alevis. This hasn't bro